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ABSTRACT: 
Over the past twenty-five years the government of Myanmar (Burma) has consolidated control over large 
parts of Shan State, neutralizing much of the threat posed by armed groups and strengthening its hold 
over revenue extraction. During this period Myanmar has retained its position as the world’s second 
largest producer of illicit opium, much of which is converted into heroin within the country’s borders. 
This article explores the relationship between state-building processes and the illicit opium/heroin 
economy in Shan State since 1988. In doing so the article seeks to achieve four aims. First, it reassesses 
the theoretical assumptions that equate illicit economies with state fragility and demonstrates instead why 
illicit drug economies can become embedded in processes of conflict reduction and state consolidation. 
Second, it explains why establishing control over Shan State has become so important to the Myanmar 
government’s state-building ambitions. Third, it analyses how the state’s engagement with the drug trade 
has become an important part of its attempts to consolidate control, in terms of financing military 
expansion and brokering deals with strongmen who are able to govern local populations. Finally, the 
article concludes by assessing how these strategies embody a form of “negotiated statehood” in which 
the state’s growing control has been defined by attempts to manage, rather than monopolize, the means of 
coercion and extraction. 
INTRODUCTION  
Over the past twenty-five years the Burmese/Myanmar
1
 state has consolidated control over large 
parts of Shan State, neutralizing much of the threat faced from armed groups in the region and 
expanding its control over revenue extraction. During this period Myanmar has retained its 
                                               
1
 In 1989 the military government changed the official name of the country from ―Burma‖ to ―Myanmar.‖ The 
change was justified by the government as means of distancing the country from its colonial past and offering a 
more inclusive name for both the country‘s Bamar majority and the multitude of ethnic nationalities within the 
country‘s borders. Many have, however, questioned this logic on both historical and linguistic grounds. The 
changing of the name of the country was also accompanied by name changes to other towns, cities and landmarks 
across the country. Rangoon, for example, was renamed Yangon, and the Irrawaddy River was renamed the 
Ayeyarwaddy. The names of many places throughout the country‘s ethnic states were also changed, replacing names 
which had meaning in ethnic languages with new Burman names or Burmanised version of the old names. In Shan 
State, for example, Kengtung was renamed Kyaingtong and Hsipaw became Thibaw. These sudden, forced changes, 
were viewed by many as another sign and the military‘s government‘s determination to create a single national 
Burman identity and its continued rejection of the ‗unity in diversity‘ politics advocated by Aung San, the leader of 
the country‘s independence movement. Lintner 2012 offers an excellent synopsis of the issues relating to these name 
changes. Today, there is little uniformity regarding which names are used. Burma and Myanmar are used 
interchangeably whilst some of the new names have gained common parlance (for example, most people use 
Yangon, with Rangoon sounding increasingly anachronistic) whilst in other cases the older names are still used 
predominantly. I have chosen to use the term Myanmar in light of its growing usage. When citing other places which 
have undergone name changes I have chosen whichever name is most commonly used and will be most familiar to 
readers. These choices are not intended to be a political statement.  
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position as the second largest producer of opium and has become a leading player in the global 
amphetamine trade. Indeed, following a period of declining production at the start of the twenty-
first century, the amount of land under poppy cultivation in Shan State more than doubled 
between 2006 and 2013, and the country‘s share of the world market of illicit opium jumped 
from 5 percent to 25 percent. Today Shan State accounts for over 95 percent of Southeast Asia‘s 
illicit opium, the majority of which is converted into heroin within the country‘s borders.2 
In this article I explore the relationship between processes of state consolidation and the illicit 
opium/heroin economy in Shan State.
3
 I analyze the nature of the state‘s interaction with the drug 
trade and describe how illicit drugs have become embedded in the processes of pacification and 
state consolidation, which policy-makers have often assumed will reduce drug production. In 
doing so I make two important contributions: an in-depth empirical analysis of what I tentatively 
call the state–drug trade nexus in Shan State, and theoretical insights into the relationship 
between illicit economies and processes of state consolidation. My approach challenges 
dominant theoretical paradigms that have reified the linkages between drugs, instability, and 
state fragility and have viewed the presence of thriving drug economies as both a sign and a 
cause of disorder and state failure. Instead, I argue that an alternative conceptual framework is 
needed, one that engages empirically with the ―politics of production‖4 and acknowledges that 
the relationship between drugs, conflict, and state consolidation/breakdown is determined by the 
social relations surrounding production and trafficking.
5
 
Engaging with the ―politics of production‖6 in Shan State I trace three lines of enquiry that I 
believe have not been adequately addressed in the literature on Myanmar‘s illicit drug trade. The 
first is geographic. The political geography of Shan State has significant variation, including 
areas under complete government control (major towns and cities such as Lashio, Taunggyi, 
Hsipaw, and Kengtung), areas in which government presence is almost entirely absent (notably 
areas close to the China border where the government has effectively ceded control to ceasefire 
groups such as the United Wa State Army [UWSA],
7
 and ―gray‖ areas in which the 
government‘s authority is contested, with the Burma Army (Tatmadaw),8 armed groups that have 
                                               
2
 UNODC 2013.  
3
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to address both the opium/heroin and methamphetamine trade, for whilst the 
political economy of the two trades share many similarities, there are also important differences. In light of the fact 
that a far greater number of people are involved in poppy cultivation and are reliant upon the revenue it generates, 
this paper focuses on analysing the political economy of opium in Shan State. 
4
 Nevins and Lee Peluso 2008, 2. 
5
 Meehan 2011, 402; van der Veen 2002, 104; Goodhand 2008b. 
6
 Nevins and Lee Peluso 2008, 2. 
7
 The UWSA was formed in 1989 after the collapse of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). It signed a ceasefire 
with the Myanmar government in May 1989. It is the largest and most powerful non-state armed group in the 
country with an estimated 20,000-30,000 soldiers. It controls a significant area of territory in north eastern Shan 
State along the China border within which the Myanmar government has almost no presence. Since the mid-1990s it 
has also controlled a heavily contested belt of territory along the Thai-Myanmar border, often referred to as the Wa 
Southern Command. 
8
 The Tatmadaw is the official name for the Myanmar Armed Forces. This term will be used throughout the piece to 
refer to the Myanmar Army. As will be explained later in the piece, the Tatmadaw embodies more than simply a 
fighting force. From the 1988 military coup until the 2010 general election, which ushered in a nominally civilian 
government, the Tatmadaw explicitly portrayed itself as spearheading the nation‘s development. At a national level 
the Tatmadaw portrayed itself as the primary defender of the country‘s Three Main National Causes, namely non-
disintegration of the union, non-disintegration of nationality solidarity and perpetuation of sovereignty. At a local 
level, in contested ‗gray‘ areas of Shan State—the focus of this study—the Tatmadaw represents the de facto 
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signed ceasefires with the government, non-ceasefire armed groups, and local militias all 
wielding state-like powers such as tax collection, the exercise of coercive power, and the ability 
to manipulate the local economy. In this article I analyze the political economy of drug 
production in the gray areas that represent substantial parts of northern, southern, and eastern 
Shan State. These areas have experienced sustained expansion of poppy production over the past 
decade, and yet have received limited scholarly attention. Numerous studies have focused on the 
Wa Special Region
9
 (SR2) and, to a lesser extent, the Kokang and Mongla Special Regions (SR1 
and SR4 respectively)
10—areas that produced the majority of Myanmar‘s opium throughout the 
1990s—but less attention has been given to the increase in poppy cultivation in other parts of 
Shan State, especially following the opium bans launched in the Kokang region in 2003 and the 
Wa region in 2005, and the balloon effect these bans have had. Unlike in the Wa Special Region, 
which is administered by its own government and enjoys extensive territorial autonomy from the 
Myanmar government, other parts of Shan State have a heavy Tatmadaw presence. These 
contrasting political geographies question whether the valuable insights offered by studies into 
the dynamics of the drug trade in the semi-autonomous regions along the China border are 
representative of Shan State as a whole, revealing a significant gap in our understanding of the 
political economy of the drug trade in Shan State. 
The second line of enquiry is temporal, focusing on the political economy of the drug trade since 
1988. Some of the most fascinating insights into Myanmar‘s drug economy have dealt with the 
relationship between opium and the region‘s complicated ethnic insurgencies throughout the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
11
 Whilst the drug trade continues to shape and be shaped by the war 
economy, the relationship between the drug trade and the political and economic changes Shan 
State has experienced over the past twenty-five years has received less  attention.
12
 My research 
aims to address this lacuna. 
The third line of enquiry examines the relationship between the illicit drug economy and the 
state. My goal is to demonstrate how and why the illicit opium/heroin economy has become an 
important foundation for attempts by the Myanmar state to pacify and consolidate control over 
Shan State. I argue that since the late 1980s the drug trade has offered the state an important 
foothold in the region. Through the engagement of state actors with the mechanisms of 
profitability, protection, and prosecution in the production and trafficking of drugs in Shan State, 
the drug trade has emerged at the apex of a dual strategy of state consolidation: (1) it has given 
the state a way to finance the pervasive militarization that has defined its penetration of the 
borderlands, and (2) it allows the state to govern through proxy authorities—predominantly local 
armed militia groups, often referred to as People‘s Militias (Pyithu Sit)—in a process of 
                                                                                                                                                       
government and has been ultimately responsible for governing these areas. Although other state institutions are 
present, including the police and civilian bureaucracy, these are subordinate to the Tatmadaw.  
9
 There is no standard terminology for describing these semi-autonomous zones. After the ceasefire agreements 
these areas were given a temporary status of ‗Special Region‘. In the 2008 Constitution the term ‗Special Region‘ 
was omitted, with the Wa Region instead being referred to as the Wa Self-Administered Division. In 2009 the 
UWSA leadership referred to the territory it controlled as the Wa State Government Special Administrative Region 
and has continued to demand a separate state under the Union rather than being administratively subordinate to Shan 
State. For the sake of simplicity I use the term Special Region.  
10
 Ko Lin Chin 2009; Kramer 2007; Lintner & Black 2009. 
11
 Lintner 1999, McCoy 1999, Smith 1991, Renard 1996. 
12
 From the outset, I want to emphasize that the intention of this line of enquiry is not to deny the perpetual 
involvement of insurgent groups in the drug trade, but to emphasize that focusing solely on the role played by these 
groups offers only a partial explanation of the political economy of drugs in Shan State. 
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negotiated statehood. I show that by letting militias profit from the drug trade with impunity and 
by giving militia leaders political opportunities and entry into the legal economy the state has 
been able to forge coalitions with militia groups that manage and maintain control over local 
populations while remaining subservient to the military‘s oversight. The engagement of state 
actors in the drug trade in Shan State extends beyond the simplistic and normative motivations of 
greed and corruption and is now instrumental in state formation in Myanmar, as I will show. 
The first of this article‘s three sections addresses the weaknesses in current conceptual 
frameworks of state building and the relationship between states and illicit practices. I propose 
alternative conceptual frameworks to define the state and to explain the role that illicit practices 
may play in processes of state consolidation. Section 2 contains a detailed empirical analysis of 
the state–drug trade nexus in Shan State since 1988, showing the central importance of the Shan 
borderland to state consolidation and analyzing the state‘s interactions with the region‘s illicit 
opium/heroin trade. The research presented here draws on interviews I have conducted in 
Yangon and throughout Shan State and the Thai–Myanmar borderland with poppy farmers, 
leaders of ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups, former militia members, community-based 
organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), government officials, and members 
of the Myanmar business community during multiple field trips to Myanmar over the past four 
years, including a nine-month period of fieldwork between October 2012 and June 2013. The 
third and final section interrogates the broader implications of the state‘s interaction with the 
illicit opium/heroin trade, analyzing how this relationship has consolidated state control, albeit in 
ways that remain contested and are geographically uneven. 
 
Photograph 1: Block of ‗Number 4‘ (heroin). Photo provided to the author by a local research organisation,    
Taunggyi, January 2013. 
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Figure 1: Shan State. 
Source: Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU). Map ID: Map ID: MIMU696v01. Created: 14 June 
2011. 
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1. ILLICIT ECONOMIES AND THE CONTESTED PROCESSES OF STATE 
CONSOLIDATION 
1.1. The drugs–conflict–state fragility nexus 
The relationship between the state and illicit economies has commonly been founded upon a 
number of implicit ―normative dualisms,‖13 notably between state and non-state actors and licit 
and illicit activities. These dualisms equate the state with law and order and relegate illicit 
activities to the status of a ―deviant subculture.‖14 As David Nugent argues, ―illegal networks are 
usually taken to point to the limits of the state…[and]…are generally seen to reflect and/or fill a 
void in state activities, to point to an absence or at least a ‗thin-ness‘ in ‗stateness‘.‖15 Using this 
analytical lens is problematic, however. As Carolyn Nordstrom‘s work powerfully demonstrates, 
the artificial analytical binaries of official state-sanctioned networks versus shadow ―extra-state‖ 
networks
16
 stunts our understanding of how states function and underestimates the significance 
of these networks to national and global economies. The reification of these conceptual 
boundaries has caused academics and policy-makers to ignore how legal and criminal goods both 
course through the same trade networks and have the same investors, how the same actors may 
navigate both networks simultaneously, and even more importantly, how extra-state networks 
can be an important foundation for the exercise of formal power.
17
 Indeed, the perception that 
criminal networks mark the frontier of state authority appears to reflect underlying normative 
assumptions about the proper role of the state, rather than being an accurate empirical analysis of 
the political economy of illicit commodities in source countries and of the role they play in state 
building and state breakdown.
18
 
The association between illicit economies and state breakdown is also rooted in the so-called 
greed/grievance literature, which has focused specifically on the economic dimensions of war, 
especially their self-financing nature in the absence of post–cold war superpower patronage.19 
Following Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler‘s influential work on the relationship between 
resource abundance and violent conflict, analysts conceptualize most contemporary civil wars as 
rent-seeking predation, with the plunder of natural resources being understood as providing both 
the motivation to fight and the means to procure weapons and finance armies.
20
 Drugs in this 
literature have been considered an especially conflict-prone resource for a number of reasons. 
First, they are thought to be an inherently lootable resource: they can be extracted without the 
use of expensive equipment and can be smuggled easily.
21
 This lootability prevents states from 
                                               
13
 Ballve 2011, 10. 
14
 Heyman and Smart 1999, 19; Meehan 2011, 378. 
15
 Nugent 1999, 68-9; see also Goodhand 2008b, 413.  
16
 Nordstrom 2000, 36. Nordstrom chooses the term ―extra-state‖ rather than ‗non-state‘ or ‗informal‘ to encapsulate 
the way in which ―while these networks are not comprised by states themselves, neither are they entirely distinct 
from, or opposite to, states – they work both through and around formal state representatives and institutions.‖  
17
 Nordstrom 2000, 42. 
18
 Milliken and Krause 2002, 753-4. 
19
 Hirshleifer 1995, 2001; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005; Collier 2000; Berdal and 
Malone 2000; Keen 1998; Grossman 1991. 
20
 Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier et al 2003. 
21
 The extent of opium‘s lootability is questionable. Although no expensive equipment is needed to extract opium, 
poppy fields cannot simply be raided. The four-month growing season, the laborious harvesting process and the 
skills required to maximise yields, mean that the ability of armed groups to extract revenue from poppy cultivation is 
dependent less upon their ability to resort to coercion and to raid poppy sites than it is on establishing durable 
relationships with upland peasant communities. Although the use of coercion, in the form of threatening eradication 
7 
 
monopolizing production or preventing extraction and, at the same time, it allows rebel leaders to 
provide credible material incentives for fighting, increasing soldier recruitment. Second, a 
thriving drug economy is deemed to require spaces that are ungoverned based on the assumption 
that greater state control would entail a clampdown on illegal activities depriving cross-border 
drug-trading networks of access to lucrative foreign markets. In its 2010 World Drug Report, the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) lays out these arguments: 
Large-scale opium poppy cultivation requires large land areas, and is a highly labour-intensive 
activity. To generate the heroin needed to satisfy global demand, thousands of hectares and 
hundreds of thousands of workers must be employed without state interference, and the best 
deterrent for state interference with this process is a rebel army. Without an active conflict, heroin 
production can be eliminated.
22
 
Third, the illicit nature of drugs is  assumed to make a peaceful resolution harder to achieve 
because the state‘s need to maintain legitimacy within the international system is perceived to 
discourage it from offering any form of negotiated settlement with rebel groups that would allow 
them to retain any control over the drug trade. As a consequence the opportunity cost of peace 
becomes extremely high for rebel groups involved in drugs. Finally, the risk premium attached to 
the production and trafficking of illicit narcotics makes them an especially profitable resource, 
increasing the likelihood that the grievances of insurgent groups may be easily corrupted.
23
 
Analysts view the long-running insurgency in Myanmar and the activities of the FARC in 
Colombia as paradigmatic examples of the corruptive capabilities of drug revenues and the 
challenges this poses to establishing a durable peace.
24
 Together, liberal state-building 
perspectives and the greed-based analysis of contemporary conflict have encouraged policy-
makers to view illicit drug economies as contributing to a downward spiral of intractable conflict 
and ever-weakening state capacity, embodying a security threat to the West by creating 
ungoverned spaces in which transnational crime and terrorism are able to flourish. 
1.2. Toward an alternative political economy of drugs and state consolidation 
Empirical studies on illicit economies have presented a more complex and nuanced picture of the 
relationship between illicit drug production and processes of state consolidation/breakdown and 
(dis)order. Although illicit economies have been caricatured as motivated by greed and governed 
by violence, this approach ignores the extent to which these networks have developed and 
reproduced their own codes of conduct and institutional structures, cross-cutting national, 
linguistic, and ethnic divides and providing a foundation for generating stability, trust, and 
order.
25
 As Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy has rightly acknowledged, ―illicit opium production largely 
outlasts war,‖ with institutions involved with illicit commodities often embedding in the political 
and economic structures that emerge in ―post‖-conflict societies.26 
In Myanmar‘s own recent history, numerous attempts have been made to harness illicit networks 
in an attempt to establish order and forge state-like institutions. In the mid 1960s, General Ne 
                                                                                                                                                       
and violence, plays a part in enabling armed groups to enforce taxation and to establish monopoly rights over opium 
sales, the relationship between armed groups and upland communities is not simply predicated upon the ability of 
armed groups to extract opium at gunpoint. See also, Ross 2004; Lujala et al 2005, 539; Snyder 2006. 
22
 UNODC 2010, 232. 
23
 Cornell 2005, 758. 
24
 Cornell 2005; Brown 1999. 
25
 Nordstrom 2000, 46-7. 
26
 Chouvy 2010, xiv. 
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Win sought to establish self-financing counterinsurgency militias (Ka Kwe Ye, or KKY) in the 
border regions by giving local armed groups permission to engage in cross-border trade, access 
to government-controlled roads, and legal impunity to engage in the drug trade if they agreed to 
disrupt the supply lines of insurgent groups.
27
 Recent studies have shown that the motivations for 
the UWSA‘s involvement in the drug trade extend beyond personal greed, with drug trade profits 
also financing its state-building efforts.
28
 Furthermore, the willingness of the Myanmar 
government to offer impunity and protection to armed groups that signed ceasefire agreements in 
the late 1980s and 1990s—enabling them to become heavily involved in drug production and 
trafficking—has challenged the notion that an active drug trade is necessarily an impediment to 
de-escalating conflict.
29
 
These findings reveal the importance of developing deeper empirical analysis of the relationship 
between illicit economies, the construction and reproduction of power, and the forging of social 
order. I endeavor to demonstrate how the duality of drug production and state consolidation in 
Myanmar‘s borderlands shows that drugs should no longer be portrayed as necessarily existing 
only in the murky underworld of ―greedy‖ rebels, organized crime, and terrorists operating in 
ungoverned spaces beyond the reach of the state; nor should they be viewed as necessarily 
perpetuating state fragility. An alternative conceptual framework is needed—one that is sensitive 
to the diversity of experiences across time and space and that engages with the ―politics of 
production.‖30 Such an approach contends that it is not the presence of illicit drug production 
itself, but instead the social relations surrounding production and trafficking that determines the 
relationship between drugs, conflict, and state consolidation/breakdown.
31
 
1.3. Defining state consolidation: Contestation over the resources of power 
The starting point for understanding the ―politics of production‖ in the drug trade in Shan State 
over the past twenty-five years is the development of a nuanced conceptual framework for 
analyzing how state power is constructed and reproduced. Such a framework must engage with 
how states actually function, rather than how they ought to;
32
 it requires moving beyond the 
―mythicized abstraction‖33 of the state and engaging instead with its empirical reality.34 It is little 
exaggeration to state that Max Weber‘s conception of the state as ―a human community that 
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory‖ has formed 
the cornerstone of Western political philosophy‘s engagement with ―the state.‖35 Throughout 
much of the postcolonial world, however, the state has rarely been able to claim a monopoly over 
the legitimate use of violence or to impose its authority autonomously over society. The 
normative tendency in the liberal peace-building paradigm to view these shaky Weberian 
                                               
27
 Although the KKY initiative was successful in further fragmenting the armed insurgency in Shan State, the 
initiative ultimately proved ineffectual as the KKY units maintained close relations with the insurgent groups whose 
territory their trade routes traversed. By the time the KKY initiative was abandoned in 1973 it had allowed some of 
Myanmar‘s most notorious drug lords, among them Khun Sa and Lo Hsing Han, both of whom had led KKY units, 
to  expand the region‘s illicit trading networks. See: McCoy 1999: 136-8; Lintner 1984, 421-4; Lintner and Black 
2009, 25.  
28
 Kramer 2007; Ko Lin Chin 2009, 2. 
29
 Meehan 2011, 386-91; Lintner 1993.  
30
 Nevins and Lee Peluso 2008, 2. 
31
 Meehan 2011, 402; van der Veen 2002, 104; Goodhand 2008b. 
32
 Heyman and Smart 1999; Lund 2006, 674. 
33
 Foucault 1991, 103. 
34
 Abrams 1988. 
35
 Weber 1919 [2004], 77-8.  
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foundations as indicative of state dysfunction and fragility has obstructed understanding of the 
diversity of (often deeply illiberal) processes through which states seek to consolidate their 
power. Indeed, between the Kantian/Rawlian virtuous state and the Hobbesian anarchic dystopia 
exists a vast array of functioning state institutions. A far more interesting starting point for 
analysis is how states function despite lacking the institutions of Weber‘s ideal state. This 
requires conceptualizing the state as an arena, or ―field of power,‖ inhabited by diverse sets of 
actors and interests with competing sources of power, legitimacy, violence, and ideology and by 
state-like institutions that are controlled by competing social groups and not managed by a single 
actor, namely, the ―government.‖36 Key to understanding politics in Myanmar‘s borderlands 
today are questions about how state institutions are constructed, how order is institutionalized, 
and how revenue structures emerge in areas where the central state has no a priori monopoly 
over the means of violence and in which the legitimacy and exercise of public authority are 
dispersed and processes of state consolidation are challenged. These processes of state 
consolidation rely less on the specific design of state-building initiatives and more on the 
―shifting constellations of power that underpin formal and informal institutional arrangements‖ 
between various social actors and on how resources (political, economic, and social) are 
distributed as a consequence of the conflicts and coalitions involving these actors.
37
 It is these 
processes of negotiation, or negotiated statehood, that define state formation, often in ways that 
are unanticipated and unplanned. 
In this context, state consolidation is defined by the contingent and dynamic contestation over 
three resources of power. The first is the competition for control over the means of coercion, 
which embodies the ability to enforce obedience. Rarely does this result in the monopolization of 
coercive power. Rather it amounts to the state‘s attempts to manage those able to wield power 
into coalition. Managing, rather than monopolizing, coercive power is an especially common and 
competitive process wherever popular sovereignty is contested and the repressive capacities of 
the state—Michael Mann‘s ―despotic power‖—are deemed essential to control populations and 
resources.
38
 
Second, state–society relations in the course of state consolidation are governed by competition 
for revenue generation in the form of control over taxation, natural resource extraction, and 
trade. Wherever the state‘s writ is weak and contested, state actors have incentives to control and 
expand revenue extraction, including financing the expansion of the state‘s coercive powers 
(army and police) and its legibility and iconography (administrative structures such as border 
checkpoints), attempts to deny those opposing state authority access to revenue flows, and 
strategies designed to direct revenue flows to the center. State actors may also seek to direct 
revenue to create what Douglass North et al. have described as ―limited access orders‖ in which 
powerful non-state actors are given access to valuable political and economic rents in an attempt 
to ―buy‖ their loyalty and encourage them to cooperate with the state rather than to challenge it.39 
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 Migdal 2001, 15. 
37
 Di John 2008: 35. 
38
 Mann 1984. ―despotic power‖ embodies the state‘s abilities to impose forcible control ‗over society‘ and 
represents the repressive capabilities of the state. Mann contrasted this with the exercise of ―infrastructural power‖ 
which represents the state‘s power to penetrate society and implement its decisions. It is seen to require a degree of 
cooperation and engagement between rulers and citizens with the state governing ‗through society‘. 
39
 North et al 2007; North et al 2009. 
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Third, state consolidation is shaped by the contest over the very legitimacy of state power. Henri 
Lefebvre‘s assertion that the modern state is a form of ―violence directed towards a space,‖40 
designed to create a unified and homogenous society in a space that ―has nothing homogenous 
about it,‖41 is a powerful corrective to state-centric analysis and captures the essence of how the 
struggle for legitimacy is a contested process in which the state has to wrestle support away from 
other social actors. The quest for political legitimacy is founded in the state‘s desire to make 
societies and cultures more easily ―legible‖ and ―governable‖ in order to control populations and 
impose regularized systems of taxation and land ownership.
42
 
1.4. The spatial dynamics of state consolidation: Borderlands and illicit economies 
The dynamics of borderlands pose a specific set of challenges to the construction and 
legitimation of state power. James C. Scott‘s conceptualization of borderlands in Southeast Asia 
as zones of hybridity and resistance provides the clearest insight into the historic challenges the 
state has faced in these spaces. He argues that Southeast Asian borderlands are zones of refuge, 
or ―shatter zones,‖ defined by activities and ideologies designed explicitly to repel the centripetal 
forces of the state‘s ―civilizing mission.‖43 Indeed, he argues, the very profile of  societies in 
these zones—low population density, extensive agriculture, and linguistic and ethnic diversity—
is a response to the state‘s efforts to control them. It is also in the borderlands, where identities 
and affiliations straddle cartographic boundaries, that the state‘s efforts to create a territorially 
defined nation state may be revealed most starkly as illusory.
44
 This is especially common in the 
postcolonial Global South, where ―most states are ‗younger‘ than the societies they purport to 
administer and the demarcation of borders preceded nation-building.‖45 
The extent to which borderland regions such as Shan State can be understood as continuing to 
repel state encroachment has been increasingly questioned. Scott himself has argued that in light 
of the growing military and technological capabilities of the state throughout the twentieth 
century his analysis is applicable only to the pre–World War II period. Furthermore, the post–
cold war emphasis on regional economic integration as a tool for development has transformed 
the perception of many borderlands from frontier regions or buffer zones to economic corridors 
that encourage states to invest resources in consolidating control over these remote areas.
46
 
However, the rhetoric promoted by states, international financial institutions, and regional 
economic bodies about the expansion of territorial control and economic integration in 
borderland regions must also be questioned. Neil Brenner rightly argues that the extension of 
territorial control is ―represented as a natural precondition of social and political existence rather 
than being seen as a product of historically determinate strategies of parcelization, centralization, 
                                               
40
 Lefebvre 1991, 280. 
41
 ibid, 308. 
42
 Scott 1998.  
43
 Scott 2009, 325.  
44
 Appadurai 2001, 7-8.  
45
 Goodhand 2008a, 228.  
46
 Notable examples include (i) India‘s Look East policy in which Northeast India has come to be viewed as an 
important gateway to economic integration with southeast Asia; (ii) the Asian Development Bank-funded Greater 
Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) initiative designed to stimulate trade between Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, 
Yunnan Province (China) and Myanmar by establishing ‗economic corridors‘ which now traverse through regions, 
such as Shan State and parts of northern Laos, over which central governments have historically commanded little 
authority. (Swe & Chambers 2011, 6). 
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enclosure, and encaging.‖47 As Brenner warns, the aim of these narratives is to shroud the 
violence, contestation, and subversion that underpin these processes and project instead state 
power and legitimacy over areas where state authority is anything but hegemonic. Indeed, there 
remains much validity to Scott‘s assertion that the exercise of state authority in borderland 
regions continues to be undermined by the fact that the state is confronted with preexisting 
structures of power relations and alternative forms of existing public authority that feel 
threatened by, and are likely to try to repel, state encroachment. This viewpoint is also reflected 
in Catherine‘s Boone‘s analysis of the political topography of the African state and her emphasis 
on how the state‘s interaction with its rural peripheries is rarely determined exogenously (by 
ideology, centrally planned strategies, or the demands of international donor institutions). Rather 
it is shaped by the existing rural structures and hierarchies with which the state is confronted.
48
 
Borderlands thus bring into focus the perpetual struggle that state actors face between the 
assertion and legitimation of state power and more pragmatic strategies that are ―forced to work 
with the grain of society.‖49 
The dynamics of illicit borderland economies cannot be abstracted from these contested 
processes of state consolidation. In many locations, including Shan State, illicit economies have 
a much longer history than the state itself. The state is therefore navigating an environment in 
which preexisting structures of authority are powerful and in which, in the case of Shan State, the 
drug trade has become the foundational pillar of local power structures. The super-rents made 
possible due to the risk premium attached to drug production gives those able to tax and trade 
drugs a way to generate capital, develop cross-border networks, generate the funds necessary to 
arm and retain soldiers, and ultimately establish patronage networks to induce loyalty and extend 
control over resources and populations. It is thus not surprising that processes of state formation 
are commonly defined by attempts to harness the relationship between drugs and power rather 
than to dismantle this relationship. 
The state‘s engagement with illicit borderland economies may be a recent phenomenon, but state 
actors control mechanisms that can be used to maximize drug rents. These include offers of 
official protection and impunity, money laundering services, the ability to convert power and 
revenue generated through illicit networks into formal authority and legal enterprises, and 
sanctioning the right to use violence. By selectively distributing these opportunities the state 
positions itself to build political coalitions, embodying a form of negotiated statehood, and a 
means through which to stabilize its authority in borderland regions over which it has wielded 
little authority. As I show below, understanding how the opium/heroin trade in Shan State has 
become deeply embedded in the construction of state power shows why drug production and 
trafficking has continued even as many drug-producing regions have come under state control. 
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2. REASSERTING THE STATE AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE STATE–DRUG 
TRADE NEXUS 
2.1. The Shan State borderlands as a “neuralgia point” of the postcolonial state 
The troubled relationship between the central state and the borderlands is one of the defining 
features of postcolonial Myanmar. The very birth of independence was reliant upon Aung San‘s 
ability to demonstrate to the British a workable solution to unifying the country. This required 
incorporating into the postcolonial nation the ―Frontier Areas‖, which had been governed 
directly by the governor of Burma as distinctly separate areas from ―Burma Proper‖ and had 
limited interaction with the colonial government.
50
 The Panglong Agreement, signed by Aung 
San and Shan, Kachin, and Chin representatives, created the foundation for a unified Burma and 
has been part of the contested iconography and ideology of the postcolonial state and borderland 
populations ever since.
51
 The unresolved issues of power distribution between center and 
margins and the constitutional contestation over questions of federalism have shaped the 
mentalities of both the central government and opposition groups in the borderlands for the past 
seven decades. The 1962 military coup was inspired by fears that tensions in the country‘s 
borderlands ―threatened to bring about the state‘s disintegration,‖52 while the militarization of the 
authoritarian state under General Ne Win‘s nationalist ideology of ―one blood, one voice, one 
command,‖ was a response to the subversion of these ideas by borderland populations and armed 
groups fighting against the government.
53
 
The capacity of the Shan State borderlands to be a neuralgia point for the postcolonial state was 
reflected in the way the region‘s dense forests and rugged hills became a refuge for opposition 
forces. During the 1950s this was seen in the difficulties the government faced expelling the 
Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) forces—which had fled across the border from Yunnan Province 
after the end of the Chinese Civil War and who were using Shan State as a base from which to 
attempt to re-invade China—and in the fears that their presence would incite a Chinese 
invasion.
54
 During the long-running insurgency campaigns against the central government after 
independence, the Shan State borderlands became home to the Communist Party of Burma 
(CPB) and other armed groups, some of which were backed by neighboring countries with a 
vested interest in preventing the Myanmar state‘s encroachment up to the region‘s porous 
borders. The government‘s struggle to assert control, often violently through military-led 
counterinsurgency campaigns (including the notorious Four Cuts Campaign, which tried to break 
the links between insurgents
55
 and local populations and so deprive resistance groups of access to 
recruits, food, finance, and intelligence) has made local populations wary about state 
encroachment, which they have invariably experienced as military abuses, forced labor, 
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expropriation of property, taxation, and intolerance of cultural diversity. This environment 
strengthened local strongmen and armed groups who proved able to hold the state at bay. By the 
1980s, the Shan State borderlands were a complex ―field of power‖ marked by intense 
contestation over the three power resources that govern state–society relations: a multitude of 
armed groups were undermining the central government‘s struggle for control over the means of 
coercion; opium production and opposition forces‘ control over the country‘s flourishing black 
market cross-border trade created lucrative revenue streams beyond the control of the 
government; and ethno-nationalism and demands for a federal constitution became powerful 
counter-narratives to the government‘s own efforts to forge popular sovereignty under a 
centralized unitary state. 
 
Photograph 2: Rural southern Shan State. Photograph by the author, Kalaw, December 2012.  
 
2.2. Myanmar’s changing political geography post-1988: The centrality of the Shan State 
borderlands 
By the late 1980s Ne Win‘s state-building strategies were failing. Chronic economic 
mismanagement had left the state close to bankruptcy; insurgency was rife throughout the 
country‘s borderlands despite decades of brutal counterinsurgency offensives; and widespread 
pro-democracy protests in 1988 demonstrated that the government was losing support in the core 
of the country. The emergence of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy 
(NLD) showed a credible opposition seemingly able to win support across ethnic groups, as 
14 
 
evidenced by the party‘s landslide victory in the 1990 election. However, new opportunities for 
state-building were also emerging, due to a constellation of shifting political, economic, and 
social dynamics that reshaped the Shan State border world. The State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (Slorc)—the military government that had replaced Ne Win‘s ailing Burma Socialist 
Programme Party (BSPP)—was quick to exploit this situation.56 
Within months of the state‘s brutal repression of the 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations, the 
CPB, the country‘s largest insurgency group, collapsed and divided into four separate armies, the 
largest of which was the UWSA.
57
 Alongside the disarray caused by the CPB‘s collapse, the 
changing attitude of Myanmar‘s neighbors also furthered the Slorc‘s state-building agenda. 
Under Deng Xiaoping, Chinese patronage of the CPB was terminated as China began to regard 
Myanmar as a potentially useful economic ally. China coveted Myanmar‘s natural resources in 
order to fuel its industrial economy. Beijing also viewed cross-border trade as a cost-effective 
way to ameliorate China‘s coast–interior divide by stimulating economic development in land-
locked Yunnan Province. Access to the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar was envisioned by the 
Chinese government as an opportunity to reduce its strategic vulnerability (caused by its reliance 
on the Malacca Straits) and to enable it to fulfill its ―two ocean‖ policy by giving it an opening to 
the Indian Ocean. In Thailand calls to improve political and economic relations with Myanmar 
were growing as part of Thailand‘s efforts to convert mainland Southeast Asia ―from sanam rop 
(battlefields) to sanam kankha (marketplaces)‖—a strategy Thailand believed would make it the 
predominant merchant state in the region.
58
  
For political and economic reasons, control over the country‘s eastern and southern borderlands 
gave the state a new opportunity to consolidate by capitalizing on the disarray caused by the 
collapse of the CPB and to gain control over the region‘s resources and border trade in order to 
improve its financial position. The Slorc reacted quickly to these emerging opportunities, 
reaching verbal ceasefire agreements with all four CPB splinter groups by June 1989, as well as 
the Shan State Army (SSA) in September 1989,
60
 and the Kachin Defence Army,
61
 Pa-Oh 
National Organisation, and Palaung State Liberation Army in 1991.
62
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The surprise surrender of Khun Sa‘s Mong Tai Army (MTA) in 1996 further transformed the 
situation in Shan State. The MTA was formed in 1985 out of Khun Sa‘s Shan United Army 
(SUA) and by the early 1990s controlled most of the Thai-Shan border. However, the stability 
afforded by the ceasefire agreements that the government reached with the former CPB splinter 
groups enabled the Tatmadaw to concentrate its forces against the MTA and other groups that 
had refused to sign a ceasefire, notably the Karen National Union. By 1996, although still a 
significant fighting force of approximately 10,000 soldiers, the MTA had suffered heavy losses 
at the hands of joint military offensives by the Tatmadaw and the UWSA, which had been 
sanctioned to move troops down to the Thai-Shan border from its heartlands around Panghsang 
in northeastern Shan State. Furthermore, the Thai authorities‘ decision to cooperate with the 
Burmese government against Khun Sa by closing the Thai border denied his army access to vital 
cross-border supplies of rice.
63
 Faced with a major internal rebellion, predominantly from among 
Shan soldiers who resented Chinese dominance within the MTA‘s leadership, Khun Sa sued for 
peace. Aware of the case of Panama‘s Manuel Noriega64, Khun Sa had also become fearful of 
U.S. indictment and in return for official protection he agreed to surrender, moving to Yangon 
where he invested in numerous legal enterprises.
65
 The surrender of the MTA, which at one time 
controlled territory as far north as Loilem and had monopolized trafficking routes into Thailand, 
had a profound impact on both the political situation and the drug trade in Shan State. 
 
Photograph 3: Myanmar-China checkpoint in Mong La, Special Region 4. Photograph by the author, May 2013. 
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The ceasefire agreements and the MTA‘s surrender marked a decisive shift in the dynamics of 
Shan State. A ―kind of post-civil-war-not-quite-peace environment‖66 emerged, defined by the 
declining strength of non-ceasefire armed groups and the renewed determination of the central 
government to pacify, control, and extract revenue from the borderlands. The Myanmar state, 
once a weak and marginalized player kept at bay by armed groups and its own limited financial 
and military resources, has become able to exert its influence. As I explain below, the state‘s 
consolidation over the past quarter century has rested on the foundation of its interactions with 
the opium/heroin trade in Shan State. 
2.3. The state–drug trade nexus, 1988–2013 
As the state began to assert greater authority across Shan State, the borderland it faced was less 
the wild, anarchic space or ―institutional tabula rasa‖67 of popular imagery and more a region 
governed by well-established local power structures, albeit structures that were complex and 
volatile due to the multitude of armed groups operating there. In a region of protracted conflict, 
poverty, underdeveloped agriculture and industry, and poor infrastructure, opium has emerged as 
a commodity success story in Shan State over the past sixty years, thanks to the qualities intrinsic 
to it. These include its guaranteed market, its low bulk and limited spoilage (reducing the 
pressure to reach markets quickly), its ability to generate more income than other cash crops 
grown in the area, the access to credit it offers, and the fact that it grows well even on steep, 
infertile land and with minimal inputs (other than labor). By the late 1980s the drug trade had 
become one of the foundational pillars of local power structures, generating revenue through 
taxation and trade, establishing cross-border trade networks, and offering a way (often the only 
way) to accumulate capital and generate the money needed to arm and retain soldiers. With 
limited finances, military, and administrative manpower, and lacking popular legitimacy, state 
actors have extended and entrenched their authority across Shan State by manipulating and 
reshaping the relationship between opium and power. Rather than using their newfound authority 
to curtail or dismantle the region‘s illicit drug production networks, they have used the drug trade 
to fulfill their state-building objectives. 
The government has followed two clear strategies in consolidating its control in Shan State: 
increasing its physical presence and coercive power across the region through a concerted 
process of military expansion, and engaging in a form of ―negotiated statehood‖ by creating 
forms of local governance—either by strengthening preexisting structures of authority or 
establishing new structures—that manage and maintain control over local populations while 
remaining subservient to the Tatmadaw‘s oversight. These forms of ―extra-state‖ governance 
have strengthened the government‘s control over rural areas and insulated the Tatmadaw from 
the rigors and risks involved in the every-day governance of these areas. The government‘s 
interaction with the region‘s illicit drug trade has become an integral part of operationalizing 
both these strategies. 
2.4 Drugs and militarized state consolidation  
The Tatmadaw, whose privileged position in the country is enshrined in the 2008 constitution, 
views itself as the cornerstone for preserving the country‘s sovereignty and spearheading its 
development. Over the past twenty-five years the government has invested heavily in the 
Tatmadaw, with military spending accounting for an estimated 30-50 percent of the annual 
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national budget.
69
 In recent years the defense budget has fallen, although for the 2013/4 fiscal 
year it still amounted to over US$2 billion, or approximately 20 percent of the national budget, 
the highest of any Asean country.
70
 Alongside the official budget there exists the so-called 
Special Funds Law promulgated on 17 January 2011, which provides the commander-in-chief of 
the Tatmadaw access to unlimited funds deemed necessary to preserve national security, without 
parliamentary scrutiny.
71
 
As Andrew Selth, one of the leading analysts of the Tatmadaw, explains, a clear rationale 
underlies the government‘s heavy military expenditure: 
The Rangoon regime envisage[d] a permanent military presence in almost every part of the 
country. In the past, Burma‘s lack of financial and military resources had meant that large tracts 
of territory were effectively beyond the government‘s control.… The central government‘s writ 
ran when there was a military presence, but the army was spread very thinly.… A permanent 
presence throughout Burma would give the Rangoon regime a number of direct benefits. It would 
permit the Tatmadaw to monitor political and military developments in the frontier districts more 
closely, exercise greater administrative control over those areas, better regulate cross-border 
traffic and improve revenue collection.… The expansion of the Tatmadaw is also linked to the 
regime‘s economic ambitions. Without the means to crush future political unrest, it cannot 
establish and maintain the kind of internal stability which it believes is necessary to encourage 
foreign investment and economic growth. Also, without a much larger army, the regime does not 
feel confident that it can protect the newly restored overland trade routes through the troubled 
border regions of China, Thailand and India.
72
 
The government has three reasons for wanting to establish a comprehensive military presence in 
Shan State: combating the ongoing insurgency in the state; establishing control over the state‘s 
coveted natural resources and cross-border trade; and encouraging local populations to comply 
with government authority. A 2007 survey estimated that over one quarter of the entire 
Tatmadaw is based in Shan State; eighty-nine infantry or light infantry battalions operate in 
southern Shan State alone.
73
 A strong military presence allows the government to launch 
offensives against armed groups that have refused to sign ceasefire agreements and to encourage 
ceasefire groups and militias to find accommodation with the government rather than challenge 
its growing presence in the borderlands. 
The military presence also allows the state to control the means of extraction. In northern Shan 
State, at least twenty-six Tatmadaw infantry units have been deployed across six townships to 
protect the route of the oil and gas pipelines that the China National Petroleum Company is 
constructing in a joint venture with the Myanmar government to deliver offshore crude oil and 
natural gas from the Bay of Bengal to China‘s Yunnan Province. In many villages along the 
route, police, Tatmadaw soldiers, and militia members work alongside each other.
74
 The gas 
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pipeline became fully operational in July 2013 and in its first year channeled almost 2 billion 
cubic meters to China. Over the next thirty years this pipeline will generate an estimated $30 
billion for the Myanmar government.
75
 In eastern Shan State the number of battalions based 
across Kengtung, Mongphyak, Tachilek, and Mongyawng townships increased from six in 1988 
to thirty-four in 2006, reflecting the strategic importance of an area through which the 275-
kilometer Route 3B road passes, linking Tachilek on the Thai-Myanmar border with Mongla on 
the China-Myanmar border.
76
 The Mekong River also flows through this region, forming the 
234-kilometer border with Laos. Both the river and road network form a major part of the Asian 
Development Bank‘s ―North-South Economic Corridor‖ initiative to link the region‘s 
economies. The militarization of this remote corner of eastern Shan State demonstrates the 
government‘s determination to create a stable and peaceful economic environment in order to 
encourage more Thai–China trade to use Route 3B.77 
Generating greater collaboration and compliance from local populations is another aim of the 
Slorc/SPDC military buildup. Stathis Kalyvas‘s convincing analysis of the dynamics of 
―irregular war‖ emphasizes ―the role of control in shaping civilian collaboration. A key point is 
that control—regardless of the ―true‖ preferences of the population—precludes options other 
than collaboration by creating credible benefits for collaborators and, more importantly, 
sanctions for defectors.‖78 Kalyvas argues that ―military resources generally trump the 
population‘s prewar political and social preferences in spawning control.‖79 The fundamental 
logic of establishing ―geographical loyalty,‖ namely, that territorial control will generate 
compliance and, ultimately, acceptance, embodies the very foundation of the Myanmar 
government‘s attempts to consolidate control throughout the country‘s borderlands.80 This logic 
has negated the Tatmadaw‘s belief that a political settlement is not necessary to generate 
stability. 
Post-1988 attempts to strengthen the Tatmadaw in the borderlands have been financed only 
partly by the central government. Instead, the Tatmadaw has been required to ―live off the land‖ 
in line with a policy that became explicit in 1997 when the government‘s War Office informed 
the Tatmadaw‘s twelve regional commanders that troops ―were to meet their basic logistical 
needs locally, rather than rely on the central supply system.‖81 Dry rations provided to soldiers 
by the central government decreased significantly as a result.
82
 Living off the land had been an 
unofficial policy during the Tatmadaw‘s counterinsurgency activities throughout the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s, but the growth in the number of military personnel deployed in the 
borderlands and the fact that the Tatmadaw became directly responsible for governing these 
regions greatly increased the need to generate more revenue locally. 
The 1988 military coup and the collapse of Ne Win‘s BSPP established the military as the sole 
political authority across the country with significant power and autonomy given to regional 
commanders. Central party committees were dismantled and BSPP–managed People‘s Councils 
were abolished and replaced at the local level by Tatmadaw-controlled Law and Order 
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Restoration Councils (later Peace and Development Councils). The Tatmadaw acts as the de 
facto local government in the contested gray areas of Shan State. Beyond its military duties, it 
manages and is responsible for financing all local administration (including police and law 
enforcement), regulating the local economy, and overseeing the local activities of numerous 
government departments, notably the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC) and 
the Central Committee for the Development of Border Areas and National Races (often referred 
to as Na Ta La). 
This near autonomy, coupled with the ever-pressing need to combat insurgent groups and expand 
the size of the Tatmadaw, required regional and battalion commanders to generate greater 
revenue with little scrutiny (or concern) for how this was achieved. 
As Maung Aung Myoe explains, 
the problem with military activities came with the decentralization of command and concentration 
of ministerial authorities in the hands of regional commanders in 1988, which opened up 
opportunities for regional commands to engage in various businesses.… Moreover, the growing 
prices of consumer goods pushed the Tatmadaw to seek off-budget external income to finance its 
welfare activities at the regional and local levels. Initially, only the command headquarters level 
engaged in business. Later, all local military units commanded by either the Commanding Officer 
(CO) or the Officer in Command (OC) were allowed to do business in the name of welfare. All 
COs and OCs were forced to find external income to finance welfare activities to pay monthly 
cash subsidies for the troops.… The Tatmadaw‘s businesses served as instruments for political 
patronage and economic rent-seeking. At the same time, these commercial enterprises provided 
financial assistance to cushion up the budgetary constraints on defence expenditure, and 
contributed to the welfare and well-being of the Tatmadaw‘s personnel and their families.83 
In order to generate revenue the Tatmadaw has built coercive and extortionate structures of 
informal taxation throughout Shan State. These encompass heavy taxation on crops, livestock, 
land, vehicles, travel (in the form of tolls), shops, and small-scale businesses, and the forced 
purchase of goods (primarily rice) at below-market prices. In the words of one Shan researcher, 
―people are quite literally paying the price of the government‘s militarization strategy.‖84 Not 
surprisingly, the Tatmadaw has also used its power in the region to derive revenue from the 
lucrative and well-established drug trade across Shan State. That this fact remains widely 
unacknowledged reflects Unodc‘s compromised position85—and its subsequent failure to inform 
on this issue—and the reluctance of analysts to engage with the findings of border-based 
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research groups, which regularly draw attention to the Tatmadaw‘s role in the drug trade.86 As 
importantly, however, it also reflects a hazy understanding of the dynamics of the drug trade in 
Shan State and the tendency to equate the Tatmadaw‘s lack of direct control over refineries and 
ownership of trafficked drug consignments with a lack of involvement in the drug economy as a 
whole. 
Ever since the 1950s the drug trade has provided two interrelated but distinct ways of generating 
revenue: (1) from the buying, refining, and cross-border trafficking of drugs, (2) and from heavy 
informal taxation. Different actors dominate these income-generating mechanisms. As the 
respected Shan academic and former leading SSA member Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, rightly 
pointed out in the late 1980s, 
those in this business [of drugs] and making money are a class of apolitical people whose sole 
interest in life is trade and profit. The majority are Chinese whose relatives, partners, friends, 
organizations, finance, loyalties, interests and obligations straddle national frontiers.
87
 
These traders and investors—some of whom have their origins in the KMT networks established 
in the 1950s and still have close links with armed groups in the region—generate the most 
income from the production and sale of heroin. Some are small-scale petty traders who engage 
with the drug trade alongside other legal business enterprises. Others are part of much larger 
cross-border networks that link drug production and refining sites in Shan State with trafficking 
networks in Yunnan and elsewhere in China and Southeast Asia. Over the years traders and 
investors have shifted their allegiance to whichever groups have proved best able to secure their 
access to opium and cross-border markets. In southern Shan State the investments have shifted 
from KMTnetworks, to the MTA, to the UWSA, and now increasingly also to militia groups 
with close links to the Tatmadaw. 
In contrast, the income generated from taxation is a function of territorial control and has thus 
been the domain of armed actors across Shan State, some of whom have also had a direct share 
in the final product itself. Indeed, even Khun Sa, the country‘s most renowned drug lord, referred 
to himself in the 1980s, only partly disingenuously, as not the king of opium but the king of 
taxing opium.
88
 The four-month-long growing season and the difficulty of concealing fields of 
poppies in full bloom increase farmers‘ vulnerability to eradication. Paying taxes has become a 
way of mitigating this risk. As one farmer from Mongton township, interviewed in 2003, 
commented, ―You pay 5,000 kyat [US$5] per acre to the local military and nobody is going to 
bother you.‖89 The need for buyers to access remote, insecure areas has also enabled those 
controlling territory to be able to tax buyers entering their territory in return for a guarantee of 
protection and in some cases a monopoly over the opium produced in a given area. Similarly, in 
an effort to avoid unwanted interference, those operating refineries and trafficking networks pay 
taxes in return for impunity, protection, and in some cases access to secure trade routes. 
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Local Tatmadaw commanders in Shan State have used these taxation mechanisms to generate 
income. As one Pa-Oh researcher explained with regards to the opium economy in Pinlaung and 
Pekhon townships in southern Shan state: 
Almost all of these taxes are informal and likely to be ad hoc, based on the decisions made at a 
local level by battalion commanders. This tax can take many forms. Farmers may be taxed in 
order to enjoy the ―right‖ to grow opium. This is a protection racket for it has the threat that 
nonpayment will lead to prosecution. They [farmers] may be taxed at harvest time in order to sell 
their opium. Farmers may also be taxed during eradication drives when headmen have to 
negotiate with those coming to eradicate the crop in order to spare their fields. The military also 
tax opium buyers in order to access rural communities and to traffic the drugs. These taxes may 
also be collected by militia groups who are given the opportunity to tax the crop in the area they 
control in return for paying a proportion of this tax to the Army.
90
 
The localized nature of taxation mechanisms and military commanders‘ desire to conceal their 
interaction with the drug trade means there is little uniformity regarding how the Tatmadaw 
collects taxes. In some areas the Tatmadaw has collected tax directly from poppy farmers, 
threatening to destroy crops if taxes were not paid. This was a regular practice in the 1990s when 
some taxes were even paid in opium rather than cash.
91
 More commonly, tax collection is 
managed through the village headman who has to collect a designated amount of tax from the 
community for the local Tatmadaw camp. In some areas, taxation is indirect, as one former 
poppy farmer from Mongnai township explained: 
We paid tax, but indirectly. The buyer would pay tax on the opium he bought from us, on our 
behalf. This tax was then deducted from the price that the buyer would pay to us for our crop. The 
buyers had to pay tax to the Burma Army. This was only once a year when the crops were sold.
92
 
The Tatmadaw also gains from issuing ―taxation rights‖ and ―opium monopolies,‖ which give 
individuals/groups the sole right to tax farmers and monopolize the purchase of opium within a 
given area in return for a fee. This method is an easy way for Tatmadaw battalions to convert 
territorial control into a means of generating income from the region‘s most lucrative commodity 
without the need to engage directly with the drug trade or to risk attack when collecting taxes in 
rural areas. The Myanmar state‘s ability to extend its military presence and to pursue ―coercion-
intensive‖93 forms of state consolidation in Shan State has been directly reliant upon the 
Tatmadaw‘s ability to generate revenues locally. The region‘s illicit drug trade has thus become 
a vital part of the finance mechanisms underpinning the militarization of Shan State. 
2.5 Drugs and negotiated statehood: The role of militias in Shan State 
Despite the heavy presence of military personnel in Shan State, developing a military state 
apparatus capable of defeating the insurgency, controlling local populations, and assuring a 
secure environment for investors remains beyond the Tatmadaw‘s reach. In short, the Weberian 
ideal of establishing a centralized monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force has been 
elusive. Pressure on local military commanders to generate results has caused them to employ a 
diverse, pragmatic, and expedient set of strategies to pacify the borderlands. These strategies 
amount to a form of ―negotiated statehood‖ that involves brokerage and coalition building rather 
than attempts by the state to monopolize and centralize control. Negotiated statehood is founded 
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upon two closely linked processes. First, recognizing that monopolizing the means of coercion is 
currently beyond its reach, the Tatmadaw has sought to establish instead ―coalitions of coercive 
force,‖ primarily with local militias. Second, the state has attempted to co-opt powerful local 
elites as a way to manage the interface between the central state and local communities. As I 
show below, the state‘s engagement with the illicit opium/heroin trade has a critical role to play 
in operationalizing these strategies. 
That local militia groups have become such an integral part of negotiated state consolidation 
strategies in Shan State is one of the most important but underreported developments in 
Myanmar‘s political economy over the past two decades. The use of local proxy militia groups is 
in itself not a new strategy: its roots lie in the legacy of the KKY initiative in the 1960s and the 
various anti-insurgency militias (thakasapha) that operated throughout the 1970s and 1980s. But 
the increase in the number of militias over the past two decades and the prioritization given to 
this strategy is significant. It demonstrates how the Tatmadaw‘s attempts to harness and 
empower local structures of authority by offering concessions to powerful actors in return for 
their support and obedience has become integral to the government‘s attempts to consolidate 
control. The origins and size of militia groups vary significantly. Many of the militias are small 
with fewer than fifty members. But large militias also operate across Shan State, as Table 1 
shows. 
Table 1: Militia groups with over one hundred men operating in Shan State 
Location (Township) Name Leader Background 
Northern Shan State    
Kutkhai Kutkhai Militia U T Khun Myat Long-time 
government 
supporter 
Kutkhai Tamoeng− 
ngen 
Militia 
U Myint Lwin Long-time 
government 
supporter 
Kutkhai Kawngkha Militia Mahtu Naw Former insurgent (ex 
KIA) 
Namkham Panhsay Militia Kyaw Myint Long-time 
government 
supporter 
Muse Mongpaw Militia U Keng Mai Militia formed by 
Myanmar Army 
Lashio/Tangyan Manpang People‘s 
Militia Force (PMF) 
Bo Mon Former MTA 
Hsipaw Hseng Keo Militia Sao Loimao and Sao 
Gaifa (TBC) 
Former insurgent 
group (ex SSA-N) 
Southern Shan State    
Homong Shan State South(SSS) 
; Homong People‘s 
Militia Force; Maha Ja 
Wa Army  
Maha Ja Former MTA 
Namzang Matkyan Lern Hsai  
(aka U Lin Hsai) 
Former MTA 
Namzang Nayai Zhou Sang Former MTA 
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Langkho Langkho Militia Lung Yo; 
Lung Chuay Puun; 
 
Unknown 
Eastern Shan State    
Mongphyak Mongphyak PMF Ja Seo Bo Long-time 
government 
supporter 
Nampong Nampong/Loi Taw 
Khan People‘s Militia 
Force 
Lt. Col. Yishay Former MTA 
Tachilek Mekong Border 
Security Battalion 
Sai Awn 
(son of Ja Seo Bo) 
Lahu militia 
Tachilek Mong Hai Militia Formerly Marku; 
current leader 
unknown 
Lahu militia 
(had close ties to 
Khin Nyunt) 
Monghsat Punako Ai Long and Ja Ngoi Unknown 
Note: The information provided in this table has been derived from numerous interviews conducted throughout 
northern, southern, and eastern Shan State and in northern Thailand with Shan, Palaung, Pa-Oh, and Lahu 
researchers, community-based organizations, local and international NGO staff, youth groups, representatives from 
ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups, and local populations. All information in the table has been obtained from more 
than one source, in many cases repeated by numerous informants. 
 
Some militias have been formed specifically with the encouragement of the Tatmadaw by local 
strongmen whom it trusts. Kyaw Myint‘s Panhsay militia and Ja Seo Bo‘s Mongphyak militia 
are prominent examples, with both leaders having been government supporters during the Ne 
Win era.
94
 Other militias have their origins in the region‘s complicated insurgency politics, being 
composed largely of leaders and soldiers who once fought against the government. The Shan 
State South (SSS), Nayai, and Matkyan militias operating in southern Shan State and the 
Manpang militia operating around Lashio, for example, are all remnants of the MTA.
95
 
The Tatmadaw utilize militias for several reasons. Beyond the major towns the Tatmadaw is 
stretched: it has extensive firepower but its morale and manpower are limited. Battalions that 
should have 700 soldiers often have only 100 to 200.
96
 Militias fill the gap, acting at times as an 
expendable force that can insulate Tatmadaw soldiers from the everyday risks of insurgent 
attacks. In the areas around the hydropower Shweli Dam 1, in northern Shan State, the 
Tatmadaw and the Panhsay militia have worked together to confiscate land, relocating an 
estimated fifteen thousand villagers, and to securitize the dam site.
97
 Understanding the terrain, 
local languages and village leaders as they do, militias have more local knowledge than 
Tatmadaw battalions. By offering insurgent and ceasefire groups a chance to become local 
militias—with a degree of local autonomy and business opportunities— the Tatmadaw has been 
able to co-opt these groups, or factions of them, more effectively than if it had demanded that the 
groups demobilize or incorporate into the regular Army. 
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Beyond the role they play in expanding the state‘s coercive reach, the militia strategy is also a 
means of converting powerful local elites with a proven ability to manage local populations and 
resources into ―state agents,‖98 enabling the central government to ―reach down‖ into the 
―peripheries.‖99 Kyaw Myint (Panhsay militia), U T Khun Myat (Kutkhai militia), Keng Mai 
(Mongpaw militia), and U Myint Lwin (Tamoeng-ngen militia), for example, were all elected as 
MPs in the 2010 election as representatives of the government-backed Union Solidarity and 
Development Party (USDP).
100
 The Tatmadaw evidently believes that incorporating such figures 
can ground state authority by blurring the distinction between local systems of government and 
centrally imposed forms of authority, which are still viewed as arbitrary and exploitative. These 
―proxy state actors‖ (or ―extra-state‖ actors, in Nordstrom‘s terminology) have become key 
modalities of interaction between local and national structures of authority, illustrating how 
state-building processes are negotiated today in Shan State. 
Once again, the state‘s interactions with the drug trade show how the state‘s consolidation 
strategies are operationalized. Rather than providing direct payment to militias, the Tatmadaw 
allows militia groups to carve out territorial enclaves across Shan State in which, alongside their 
counterinsurgency activities, they are free to generate income however they like.
101
 Some 
militias, especially those led by former MTA members, have had a decades-long involvement in 
drug trafficking, whilst others now have a privileged opportunity (together with businessmen 
linked to them) to become new players in the drug trade. In many drug producing areas farmers 
are required to sell their opium to the local militia operating there, creating localized monopolies 
founded upon coercive predation. Symbiotic relations between Tatmadaw units and militias have 
created what may be described as hierarchies of extraction: militias profit from the drug trade in 
return for fighting insurgency, ensuring local stability, and providing access to areas under their 
control. In this way, Tatmadaw battalions benefit indirectly from the drug trade by creating 
unofficial protection rackets that allow them to profit from their connections with the militias 
whilst keeping a layer of distance and subterfuge between themselves and drug profits. 
Kyaw Myint‘s Panhsay People‘s militia offers a fascinating insight into the ways the drug trade 
has become embroiled in strategies to pacify and consolidate control over Shan State. Kyaw 
Myint (aka Li Yongqiang, or U Win Maung) is a long-time loyal government supporter in 
Namkham township, close to the China border in northern Shan State.
102
 In the 1980s he was the 
leader of a counterinsurgency militia operating in the area. In 1991 this group became known as 
the Panhsay People‘s militia. Today it has an estimated 300+ members.103 Kyaw Myint enjoys 
close links with the Tatmadaw, especially former northeast regional commander Myint Hlaing, 
and controls a strategic area of the China–Myanmar border, including crossings on the Mao-Ruili 
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River that forms part of the border.
104
 With over thirty years of proven loyalty, Kyaw Myint 
offers the Tatmadaw a safe pair of hands for the delegation of local authority in an area that is 
heavily contested. The Tatmadaw regularly uses the Panhsay People‘s militia in its 
counterinsurgency operations, notably in 2006 during the operation to capture SSA Commander 
Lt-Col Khun Kyaw and in recent clashes with the Ta‘ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).105 
Kyaw Myint, who is Lisu-Chinese, is also an influential figure in Yunnan Province. The 
Tatmadaw value him as a reliable source of information on cross-border political and economic 
developments as well as a facilitator between the military and Chinese companies seeking work 
in northern Shan State.
106
 Thanks to the impunity and protection Kyaw Myint has been given for 
his services his organization is now one of the largest drug producers in Shan State. He controls a 
large poppy-growing area centered on  Panhsay, the highest hill area in Namkham, employing 
large numbers of laborers and using greater amounts of fertilizers and pesticides than in other 
poppy-growing regions in Shan State. Some farmers have reportedly migrated to the Panshay 
area aware that Kyaw Myint‘s protection reduces the risk of crop eradication.107 Kyaw Myint has 
also been granted permits and licenses to operate a number of other licit businesses in the area. In 
2010 he was elected as an MP to the Shan State Parliament as a representative of the 
government‘s USDP, in an election campaign that promised that poppy cultivation in the area 
would be protected for another five years.
108
 
 
3. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE DRUG TRADE: FORTIFYING OR 
FRAGMENTING THE STATE? 
The illicit opium/heroin trade in Shan State has a number of intrinsic qualities that make it 
particularly malleable to processes of state consolidation. First, as a high value commodity, 
opium can be taxed heavily yet still remain profitable. This has enabled the Tatmadaw to tax the 
drug trade in order to finance the expansion of a military and administrative apparatus in an 
unruly region where the cost of such expansion has been prohibitive. The same rationale given 
for the involvement of insurgent groups in illicit economies—namely, to finance recruitment and 
maintain the welfare and morale of troops—is equally applicable to the Tatmadaw and its 
proxies in light of their inability to cover the costs of military expansion from the central 
coffers.
109
 
Second, the illegality of drug production and trafficking has meant that the state‘s ability to offer 
impunity and protection has created a system of rents with which to build coalitions with local 
powerful actors who would otherwise have little incentive to cooperate with the state. 
Furthermore, the illicit nature of opium/heroin creates incentives for those involved to seek ways 
to convert power and revenue obtained from their position in the drug trade into more secure 
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forms of formal authority and legal economic enterprises. By straddling the interface between the 
illicit and licit economies the state has encouraged local strongmen to accommodate with the 
state: they carry out state-like functions in return for opportunities to ―diversify‖ and potentially 
―graduate‖ out of the illicit economy.110 Access to legal business opportunities have become 
especially coveted in that Shan State‘s growing integration into regional markets offers lucrative 
opportunities to incorporate the area‘s natural resources into global commodity chains. The 
illegality of the drug trade has also given the state the upper hand in its coalitions with proxy 
state actors and this allows them to wield the perpetual threat of prosecution in order to suppress 
groups it views as having become too powerful or autonomous. This was the case in August 
2009 when The New Light of Myanmar, the state‘s official mouthpiece, justified the Tatmadaw‘s 
devastating offensive against the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army 
[MNDAA]ceasefire group in the Kokang region, stating that 
Kokang national race leaders stuck to dictatorship and warlord system and showed total disregard 
for the law by manufacturing illegal arms and ammunition and trafficking narcotic drugs on a 
large scale. So, the government had no choice but to take action against the offenders in 
accordance with the law.
111
 
Third, the fact that opium is a diffuse rather than a point resource
112—with poppies blooming 
across much of Shan State—has allowed the Tatmadaw to form alliances with militias across the 
region whilst adhering to its preferred strategy of proliferating power across an array of armed 
groups rather than concentrating power within a small number of proxy forces. 
However, close analysis of the state‘s interaction with the opium/heroin trade reveals a number 
of definite limitations when gauging how these processes have fortified state control in Shan 
State. First, as Ken Maclean‘s 2008 study demonstrates, brokerage strategies have created 
complex and overlapping networks of ―Tatmadaw field battalions, cease-fire groups, state-owned 
enterprises, and local entrepreneurs,‖113 creating ―mosaics of territorial control‖114 over which 
the state has found it difficult to consolidate control. Indeed, as Tom Kramer has perceptively 
argued, the state‘s actions in the borderlands can be seen as effective at ―managing conflict rather 
than resolving it.‖115 
The challenges this poses are exacerbated by the fact that in many cases it is in areas where the 
state is most dependent upon exercising authority through negotiation and coalition building—
areas where the Tatmadaw has only recently gained a foothold or where armed groups still retain 
influence and legitimacy—that these coalitions are likely to be at their weakest and most 
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unstable. The state‘s ability to use the drug trade to consolidate its control has, therefore, been 
uneven, adding further complexity to Shan State‘s political geography. The government‘s 
interaction with the UWSA and the National Democratic Alliance Army [NDAA], has had 
limited success. Although unofficial impunity and the offer of legal economic opportunities 
played an important role in securing ceasefire agreements and ending outright conflict, the areas 
close to the China border which these groups govern remained largely autonomous and have 
proved able to keep the central state at bay. In other parts of Shan State, however, Tatmadaw 
expansion and the formation of proxy militias across Shan State have increased the territorial 
reach of state authority by securitizing remote areas and extending control over populations and 
resources in these areas. The construction of the oil and gas pipelines, which tread a path through 
former insurgent-controlled territory, would have been unthinkable a mere two decades ago. 
Today they embody the very tangible consolidation of state control. 
A second ambiguity lies in the contradiction between localized strategies of state consolidation 
and internationally accepted norms of the ―proper‖ role of the state. This contradiction makes 
establishing durable and stable state–society relations through interaction with the illicit trade of 
opium problematic. State officials, militia groups, and farmers know that on the international 
stage their activities are illegal. The government‘s attempts to consolidate control through 
engagement with the drug trade, whilst avoiding international condemnation, has created 
instability and insecurity, fostering an environment in which official complicity, impunity, and 
support for the trade goes hand in hand with periodic antidrug raids and eradication programs. 
Such contradictory impulses will likely intensify as the government continues to strive for 
control over the region whilst the country‘s re-engagement with the West raises international 
expectations that the central government will reduce the flow of drugs from its borderlands. In 
this context, the bargaining processes surrounding the drug trade are unstable, with rules of the 
game that are never clear. Perpetual informality seemingly governs the coalitions that have been 
forged around the drug trade. This informality—and the potential it provides for plausible 
deniability of involvement—allows actors to navigate the complex contradictions between sub-
national, national, and international approaches to the drug economy. This raises critical 
questions about how the drug trade can continue to provide a foundation for state consolidation 
in Myanmar. 
Finally, perhaps the greatest anomaly in the Myanmar state‘s relationship with the illicit 
opium/heroin trade lies in the fact that it further subverts the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of 
the region‘s population. The permissive environment surrounding the drug trade has, 
unsurprisingly, increased the supply of drugs in Shan State, with the Unodc estimating that 10 
percent of heroin produced in Myanmar is now consumed within the country.
116
 Claims that the 
central government has been willing to ignore the social scourge caused by rising addiction rates, 
especially amongst the young, in order to facilitate the emergence of docile, ill-educated ethnic 
populations, may be far-fetched, but the incessant repetition of this claim during my fieldwork 
interviews reflects the corrosive impact that the state‘s interaction with the drug trade has had 
upon its attempts to forge popular legitimacy. The state‘s willingness to empower and govern 
through local militia groups has also created an environment of permissiveness toward the 
exploitation and expropriation of rural communities at the hands of these proxy authorities. Such 
experiences undermine the legitimacy of local authority structures, raising questions about the 
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extent to which they can provide stable governance and control over local populations and 
resources. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the dominant paradigms concerning the relationship between illicit drugs, instability, 
and state fragility, the case of Shan State reveals how the opium/heroin trade has been co-opted 
by the Myanmar state to fortify its control in the region over the past twenty-five years. In its 
interaction with the drug trade, the state has established a greater degree of control over many of 
the gray areas of Shan State where its authority has historically been extremely weak. However, 
this interaction does not open a clear path for the state to centralize its control and such a 
teleological outlook should be avoided. Indeed, the state–drug trade nexus has instead resulted in 
processes of negotiated statehood, defined by brokerage, coalition-building, and the management 
rather than state monopolization of the means of coercion and extraction. As I have sought to 
show, there remains enduring relevance to Mary Callahan‘s warning that those seeking to 
decipher developments in Myanmar‘s borderlands must acknowledge that ―these emerging 
political complexes are not simply unfortunate bumps in the road to peace but instead constitute 
intricate and evolving social systems that may continue to be adapted and sustained.‖117 
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